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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NUISANCE
HOME OWNERS RIGHTS VERSUS INDUSTRIAL EXPEDIENCY
Plaintiffs sought damages for odors which necessarily interfered
with the use, occupation, and wholesome enjoyment of their homes.
The odors were emitted by the defendant's tannery. Held, for de-
fendant. Since the evidence showed that the defendant's tannery was
located in an industrial area, that it was an essential industry, and
that it operated in the most modern manner with the approval of the
state board of health, the plaintiffs could not recover in the absence
of a showing of material injury to their health or property, for it is
against public policy to interfere with normal industrial activity.1
Ever since Aldred's Case2 it has been the settled law that one
may not so use his private property as to permeate the air with "dis-
gusting smells" and thus render the occupancy of adjoining property
uncomfortable. 3 The courts unanimously pronounce the common law
axiom that one has " . . . the natural right to have the air diffused
over his premises reasonably free from smoke, fumes, gases and
other impurities."4  However, in the expediency of encouraging indus-
trial enterprise, modern tribunals have so excepted and construed the
"reasonably free" clause that private property owners have been com-
pelled to sacrifice many of their "natural" rights to comfortable en-
joyment of their premises to the public interest in fostering industry.5
1. Gardner et al. v. International Shoe Company, 319 Ill. App. 416,
49 N.E. (2d) 328 (1943).
2. William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. R. 81( (K.B. 1610).
3. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523 (1897).
4. Emil Feder v. Perry Coal Company, 279 Ill. App. 314, 318 (1935);
accord, United States v. Luce et al., 141 Fed. 385, 414 (1905);
Higgins v. Decorah Produce Company et al., 214 Iowa 276, 242
N.W. 109, 111 (1932). Professor Harper stated this rule as fol-
lows: "But while the doctrine of ancient lights and the easement
of air over adjoining lands is repudiated, it is a nuisance to un-
reasonably pollute the air with soot or smoke, dust, foul odors,
gases, and other annoying and offensive substances to the dam-
age of adjoining land occupiers in the use and enjoyment of their
property." Harper, "Torts" (1933) 383. See 39 An. Jur. (1942)
§53, p. 335.
5. In denying an injunction against a sawmill the Washington Su-
preme Court said: "The manufacture of lumber is the most im-
portant business of Western Washington, and no urnecessary in-
terference therewith will be permitted." Bartel et ux. v. Ridge-
field Lumber Company, 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306, 309 (1924).
See Higgins v. Decorah Produce Company et al., 214 Iowa 276,
242 N.W. 109, 111 (1932). See also Harper, "Torts" (1933) 185.
6. The Alabama Supreme Court, citing several cases, has said, "In
general, home owners and occupants, as well as all others, must
endure, without legal recourse, all those petty annoyances and
discomforts ordinarily and necessarily incident to the conduct of
those trades and businesses which are usually a part of municipal
life, and which are more or less essential to the existence and
comfort and progress of the people." Dixie Ice Cream Company
et al. v. Blackwell et al., 217 Ala. 330, 116 So. 348, 349 (1928).
See The Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Catharine Grabill, 50
Ill. 241, 244 (1869), wherein it is said, "Such consequences of the
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It is common knowledge that industry has its necessary concomitants
which must be borne by the public without hope of legal redress.6
-There are innumerable instances of the clash of the interests of
industry and private property.7 The extent of the industrial privilege
to burden home owners with its inescapable inconveniences depends
upon the locality,8 utility of the industry,9 and the effect upon the
neighbors' comfort.' 0 Conceding the liability of industry for nuisance
in residential areas,"1 for actual injury to health and property,12 and
construction and use of railroads must be borne by all living near
them, without complaint and without hope of redress, for they
are inseparable from the purposes and objects of such structures."
See also Strachan et al. v. Beacon Oil Company, 251 Mass. 479,
146 N.E. 787, 790 (1925); Haber v. Paramount Ice Corporation,
239 App. Div. 324, 267 N.Y. Supp. 349, 352 (2d Dep't 1933).
7. Interesting dicta is found in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court opin-
ion where the court in speaking of this clash said, that although
the public is benefited by industry, still industry is the result of
private enterprise, conducted for private profit and under the
control of the producer. "The interests in conflict in this case
are therefore not those of the public and of an individual, but
those of two private owners, who stand on equal ground as en-
gaged in their own private business." Sullivan et al. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Company, 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1065, 1070 (1904).
8. See Stevens et al. v. Rockport Granite Company, 216 Mass. 486,
104 N.E. 371, 374 (1914); De Muro et al. v. Havranek et al., 153
Misc. 787, 275 N.Y. Supp. 186, 191 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1934);
Kennedy v. Frechette, 45 R.I. 399, 123 Atl. 146, 148 (1924);
Scruggs v. Wheeler, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 4 S.W. (2d) 616,
618 (1927).
9. See Monroe Carp Pond Company v. River Raisin Paper Company
et al., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325, 328 (1927); William Daughtry
v. Samuel B. Warren et al., 85 N.C. 119 (1881). See also 39 Am.
Jur. (1942) §16, p. 298.
10. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, quoting from 46 C.J. 655, in
propounding a test for nuisance, said: " . . . whether a busi-
ness lawful in itself . . . constitutes a nuisance, is the reason-
ableness or unreasonableness of conducting the business or mak-
ing the use of the property complained of in the particular lo-
cality and in the manner and under the circumstances of the
case." Ebur et al. v. Alloy Metal Wire Company, 304 Pa. 177,
155 Atl. 280, 282 (1931). Harper determines the privilege by
• . . reference to all the conditions of the parties, the cir-
cumstances of the situation and the balancing of advantages and
disadvantages incident to the defendant's conduct for all concerned."
Harper, "Torts" (1933) 376. Professor Prosser has said that the
extent of this industrial privilege is determined " . . . by weigh-
ing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility
of the defendant's conduct." Prosser, "Torts" (1941) §73. See
Note (1938) 185 L.T. 351, 352; Prosser, "Nuisance Without Fault"(1942) 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See E. Harold Wineland, State's Attorney, ex rel. William Abeln
et al. v. M. Huber, Inc., et al., 275 fll. App. 264, 279 (1934);
J. S. Wylie et al. v. James G. Elwood, 134 Ill. 281, 288, 25 N.E.
570, 571 (1890).
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for negligence,13 the real problem arises when an essential industry
unavoidably delimits the right to enjoyment of private homes.14 Un-
der such circumstances is actual injury to health or property a condi-
tion precedent to industrial liability?
State statutes generally include interference with comfortable en-
joyment of life and property among those things for which a cause
of action for nuisance will lie, thus clearly implying that one has a
right to the enjoyment of his premises over and above his right to
freedom from actual injury.15 Legal scholars uniformly agree that
a plaintiff is entitled to recover for discomfort and inconvenience.16 It
was declared in a celebrated federal case that a nuisance was that
" . . . which annoys and disturbs one in the possession of his prop-
erty, rendering its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable
to him. For such annoyance and discomfort the court of law will
afford redress by giving damages against the wrongoer. . . .
Thus it appears well established that personal discomfort is a distinct
element of damages.18
Confronted with the fact that the weight of authority clearly
asserts that personal discomfort is a distinct element of damages,
13. The Illinois Supreme Court has said " . . . that a recovery can
and should be had for such damages as arise out of the careless
or negligent acts of a railroad company in regard to any usual
and necessary appurtenance to their road, cannot be denied." The
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Catharine Grabill, 50 Ill.
241, 244 (1869). See Adam Eckart et al. v. City of Belleville,
294 Ill. App. 144, 13 N.E. (2d) 641 (1938); Henry Sawyer &
another v. Charles G. Davis & others, 136 Mass. 239, 242 (1884).
See also Harper, "Torts" (1933) §§180, 181.
14. A recent comment on a Washington Supreme Court decision used
the following language: "No showing of negligence was made; in
fact is was shown that the cement company had installed the best
equipment and had eliminated the nuisance as much as possible.
This being so, it is to be concluded that the dust is an inescapable
burden giving rise to the problem as to whether the nuisance-
creating industry or the private home owner must bear the cost."
Comment (1943) 18 Wash. L. Rev. 31, 32.
15. Ind. Acts 1881, (Spec. Sess.), c. 38, §709, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) §2-505; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 38, §466 (8), Ill. Stat. Ann.
(Jones, 1936) §37.415.
16. See Harper, "Torts" (1933) §180, 186; Prosser, "Torts" (1941)
575; Restatement, "Torts" (1939) §822, p. 228. A case comment
severely criticizing a recent decision, analogous to the decision
in the principal case, has cited a long line of judicial decisions
emphasizing the point that damages are recoverable solely on the
basis of discomfort. Comment (1943) 18 Wash. L. Rev. 31.
17. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company v. Fifth Baptist Church,
108 U.S. 317, 329 (1883).
18. See United States Smelting Company v. Sisam, 191 Fed. 293, 302
(C.C.A. 8th, 1911); Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company v.
Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330 (1883); .Judson v. Los
Angeles Suburban Gas Company et al., 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581,
582, 583 (1910); Boyd v. City of Oskloosa, 179 Iowa 387, 161 N.W.
491, 492 (1917); Oklahoma City v. Eylor, 177 Old. 616, 61 P. (2d)
649, 651 (1936) ; Chandler et al. v. City of Olney, 126 Tex. 230, 87
S.W. (2d) 250 (1935); Mattson et ux. v. Defiance Lumber Com-
pany, 154 Wash. 583, 282 Pac. 848, 850 (1929).
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is it not manifestly inconsistent to deny damages because there is
proof of no actual injury to health or property? It is submitted that
proof of the absence of actual material injury to the plaintiffs' health
or property is nothing more than evidence as to the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct.
VENUE
COURT RULES AND SELECTION OF JUDGE
Consonant with the modern trend toward improvement of our
judicial system, there has been dissatisfaction with the manner
of selecting special judges in Indiana.' A segment of the problem is
represented by the change of judge under the venue statutes. 2 The
proposition here considered is whether the act of 1937,3 recognizing
the power to regulate procedure by court rule,4 affords a method for
accomplishing reform in this field.
The principal consideration is whether the selection of judge upon
change of venue is a matter of "procedure," "substance," or "jurisdic-
tion."5 That it is not within the realm of substantive law seems almost
too clear for argument.6  " . . . 'substantive law relates to rights
and duties which give rise to a cause of action' while procedural law
'is machinery for carrying on the suit.'"7 Although parties have
1. See, for example, Report of the Indiana State Committee on Gov-
ernmental Economy on the Administration of Justice in Indiana
(1934) 10 Ind. L. J. 111, 127.
2. Acts 1907, c. 81, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-1409;
Acts 1903, c. 195, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§2-1412
through 2-1414; Acts 1919, c. 70, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-1415; Acts 1937, c. 103, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1941)
§2-1424; Acts 1937, c. 85, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1941)
§2-1430.
3. Acts 1937, c. 91, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1941) §2-4718;
Acts 1937, c. 91, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1941) §2-4719.
4. For a comprehensive annotation on rule-making power, see 110
A.L.R. 22.
5. See 1 Gavit, "Indiana Pleading and Practice" (1941) 12, where it
is argued that "for the purposes at hand," these three categories
classify the entire field of law.
6. The words "practice" and "procedure" together "include mode of
proceeding by which legal right is enforced as distinguished from
substantive law which declares the right." King v. Schumacher,
32 Cal. App. (2d) 172, 89 P. (2d) 466, 472 (1939). "In general
terms substantive law can be defined as including that body of
rules which regulates the conduct and relationship of members
of society and the state itself as among themselves apart from
the field of litigation and jurisdiction." 1 Gavit, "Indiana Plead-
ing and Practice" (1941) 12.
7. Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 1001, 104 S.W. (2d) 371,
378 (1937).
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